In Aymara, Next Week is Behind You:
Convergent Evidence from Language and Gesture in the Crosslinguistic Comparison of Spatial Construals of Time

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Introduction.

It is now widely recognized that time is conceptualized spatially in a wide range of languages and cultures – indeed, that all languages so far examined take their vocabulary of time primarily from that of space. More specifically, a few basic metaphoric mappings from the spatial domain to the temporal one recur in language after language. Models involving (1) the temporal experiencer as mover in space (We’re coming to the end of the year) and (2) times as entities moving with respect to a static experiencer (The end of the year is approaching) have been noticed as crosslinguistically dominant over and over again.¹ In both these cases, an event in the future is seen as “in front of” the experiencer – assuming that the experiencer is facing the flow of events –

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WOLOF: Moore 2000 (and see added crosslinguistic references). CHAGGA: Emanatian XXXX. CHINESE XXXX. TURKISH: Özcaliskan XXXX. JAPANESE: Shinohara XXXX. BALI XXXX??

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while a past event is behind the experiencer (bygone days are behind us, while the week ahead of us is approaching). Languages around the world showing such patterns are as diverse as the Indo-European family (at large), Hebrew, Wolof from Senegal, Japanese, and Chinese. Although most languages have more than one metaphorical understanding of time, so far all documented languages (with the exception to be discussed below) appear to share a spatial metaphor mapping future events onto spatial points in front of Ego and past events onto points behind Ego.

Aymara, an Amerindian language spoken in the Andean highlands of Bolivia, Peru and northern Chile, presents a fascinating contrast to these well-known patterns, and a challenge to the crosscultural universals of metaphoric cognition which have been slowly building up in our databases. In Aymara, the basic word for FRONT (nayra, “eye/ front/ sight”) is also a basic expression meaning PAST, while the basic word for BACK (q’ipa “back/ behind”) is a basic expression for FUTURE meaning. This pattern immediately raises questions: how seriously do we take this pattern as evidence about the cognitive patterns of Aymara speakers? Is it in fact an instance of the same mappings we have seen in other languages, “reversed” in some way, or are there quite different metaphoric mappings involved? And how would we know?

Two main questions are at issue. First, does Aymara really have a configuration of temporal metaphors which is unattested in other languages? And second, does it really lack the canonically expected metaphoric mappings of space onto time? As we
shall see, in order to answer these questions we will need to get more precise about both the Aymara metaphors and the “expected” ones. In fact, as we shall see, it seems impossible to resolve some of these issues from linguistic data alone.

However, we have taken advantage of an added data source in the gestures accompanying Aymara speakers’ descriptions of time. Speech-accompanying gesture is a universal phenomenon, and is of interest to cognitive science in particular because it is a less conscious and monitored track than language (McNeill 1992, 2000). It has been noted (McNeill 1992, Cienki 1998, Sweetser 1998, Smith 2003, Núñez [in press]) that metaphoric gesture often systematically accompanies metaphoric speech – iconic gestures such as a hand moving upwards, for example, may accompany an utterance such as Prices soared, while a downwards gesture is highly unlikely in such a context.

As with speakers of other languages, systematic directional gestures accompany Aymara speakers’ temporal reference to past and future; the gestures show coherent mappings of temporal structure onto space which elaborate and clarify the metaphoric structure evidenced in the linguistic data.

We shall eventually argue that Aymara time metaphors do represent a radically different metaphoric mapping from the ones commonly found in the languages around the world studied so far. Aymara thus appears to be the first well-documented case presenting a genuine fundamental difference in the organization of time construals. Interestingly, it is not difficult to find an embodied experiential motivation for these

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2 Aymara is a member of the Jaqi family, which also includes Jaqaru and Kawki (Hardman, 1981, 1988). For
“different” metaphors; it turns out that Aymara and (for example) English could be seen as basing their temporal metaphor systems on somewhat different aspects of humans’ basic embodied experience of the environment. But given how unusual the Aymara metaphors for time are, new questions are raised about the cultural matrix within which particular spatial experiences of time are developed and linguistically coded.

1. Metaphors for time: universals and cultural variability.

1.1. What counts as a case of “future is behind”?

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have proposed experiential bases for spatial construals of time (M. Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1993, Lakoff and Johnson 1999). These bases lie in shared bodily experience of space and its correlation with temporal experience; they thus provide a potentially universal basis for spatiotemporal metaphors. To others it seems equally evident that cultures vary radically in their understanding of time (Thornton 1987, Klein 1987, Grebe 1990, Dahl 1995, Øyvind 1995). These two viewpoints are not necessarily incompatible: humans often have more than one construal of a given complex domain (for examples in Arithmetic reasoning, see Lakoff and Núñez, 2000), so it would be perfectly possible for there to be both some very culture-specific and some universal models of time. However, this particular details about the Aymara language and its social, historical, and cultural context, see Hardman (1981), Grebe 1986, and Albó (1988).
debate seems largely based on inaccurate comparisons, which have led to the postulation of mythical contrasts.

To exemplify the problems underlying claims about exotic languages where “future is behind” and “past is in front,” let’s examine an equally exotic language, English. Noting that English speakers readily say things like Christmas follows Thanksgiving, or Christmas comes after Thanksgiving meaning that Christmas comes later than Thanksgiving, we might seize on the “later than” relation and equate it with (relative) futurity. And since follow and come after are relations of “behindness” (a follower is behind the person he follows), we can now claim that in English the future is behind. But behind what? We could not say, in English, that Christmas is behind us, or Christmas is following us, to mean that Christmas is future relative to the speaker’s NOW. Indeed, Christmas is behind us is perfectly grammatical, but only in the sense that Christmas is in the speaker’s past, not her future. ³ Similarly one could also claim that in English the “past is in front” because we can find expressions such as ahead of time, or twenty minutes ahead of one o’clock (NPR time announcement for 12:40), where ahead of means “earlier than.” Here, we have a clear answer to the question, “In front of what?” – this is about the relation between two times, neither of which is the speaker’s Now. One cannot say ahead of us meaning “earlier than the present” – instead, it means “later

³ Etymologically, note that the fore in before meant “in front of” (we still call the front end of a ship the fore, and the front upper surface of the head the forehead. Precede etymologically meant “go in front of.” Similarly, the aft in after is historically the same “behind” etymon which occurs in the aft (rear) end of a ship.
than the present.” As Moore (1999) lucidly explains, many of the claims in the literature about languages where “future is behind” and “past is behind” seem to be based on this kind of confusion of different reference points for the front-back relationship.

The problem is that we must not confuse futurity (reference to times later than NOW) with posteriority (reference to one time as being later in a sequence than another). Not every instance of “later than” relations is an instance of “later than now.” Similarly, we must not confuse past (reference to times earlier than NOW) with anteriority (reference to one time as being earlier in a sequence than another). Again, not every instance of “earlier than” relations is an instance of “earlier than now.” Future and past are inherently deictic semantic categories; you have to know the position of Ego (i.e., when the relevant speaker’s present is), to be able to calculate the time reference of a future.

The situation in Aymara attracted our attention because it seems to be the only case in the literature where indeed Future (not general posteriority) seems to be metaphorically IN BACK OF EGO, while Past appears to be IN FRONT OF EGO. Our examination of psycholinguistic and ethnographic data has only confirmed these preliminary impressions. There is some evidence suggesting that the mapping may be shared by other neighboring languages – it may be an areal feature. In any case, this exceptional pattern demands our attention. If the universalists are right, why does this

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4 Note the contrast between ahead of and in front of (one cannot say in front of time). This will be discussed
case exist at all? If the cultural variability advocates are right, why are the other common patterns so pervasively stable across so many unrelated languages around the world?

In order to explain the Aymara situation, we must first lay out the precise structures of the metaphorical models of time which have been noticed in other languages. Then we must identify the mappings in Aymara, to make sure that we are indeed comparing and contrasting comparable data.

1.2. Patterns of mapping space onto time.

Research in conceptual metaphor theory has made significant progress since its beginnings in the early 80’s, showing that there is an extensive conventional system of conceptual metaphors in every human conceptual system. In what concerns metaphorical expressions involving time, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) noticed that in English, people talk both about going to do future actions, and about future events as coming events. They studied in detail the metaphorical mappings involved in these kinds of linguistic usages, and summarized their findings with a general conceptual metaphor which allows the conceptualization of time in terms of motion in space. In its general form, this metaphor was known as Time Passing is Motion metaphor (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). In related work, Fleischman (1982a, b) examined the

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5 Martha Hardman (p.c); Peña Cabrera 1997; Calvo Pérez 1993; Mapuche XXXX.
etymological relationship of the Romance tense systems to these metaphorical mappings. From the work of these workers, as well as from that of Clark (1973), came an important division between Moving-Time and Moving-Ego metaphors. Lakoff (1993) identified these as two different special cases of Time Passing is Motion metaphor, namely, Time Passing is Motion of an Object (Moving Time), and Time Passing is Motion Over a Landscape (Moving Ego), respectively. The former has a fixed canonical observer where times are seen as entities moving with respect to the observer (Fig. 1a), while the latter sees times as fixed objects where the observer moves respect to time (Fig 1b). In these mappings the stationary entity is the deictic center.

Psychologists have since given experimental evidence that real or represented physical motion scenarios can prime parallel construals of time – perhaps simply by activating the relevant source domain (Boroditsky 2000; Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002; Gentner, Imai and Boroditsky 2002). Speakers who have just been moving (e.g. traveling on a plane or a train) or imagining self-motion are primed to give Moving-Ego rather than Moving-Time interpretations of metaphorical time phrases in English. For example, their interpretation of ambiguous forms such as the meeting was moved forward (Lakoff’s now famous [1993 example]) is biased towards understanding forwards as “to a later time” (=Moving-Ego metaphor) if they are primed by a self-motion scenario.7

[Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here]

7 Cf. Also Gentner (2001) on the processing effects of consistent vs. inconsistent temporal metaphorical
Although most of the research cited above divides time metaphors simply into two classes, Moving-Ego and Moving-Time, and those terms have been used as inverses: either Ego is construed as moving with respect to a temporal landmark, or Time is construed as moving with respect to Ego. In fact the data show more complex patterns. Not all spatial language for time is dynamic: There’s no time to do my homework because the class meetings are too close together simply treats times as locations. And crucially, when time is construed as moving, it is not always with respect to Ego as a reference point. In December follows November, times are construed as moving, and November is a moving reference point (with directional front-back orientation) for the location of December; there is no Ego reference point, although there is some broader temporal “landscape” as a frame of reference. This is quite distinct from Christmas is coming, which shows Time as moving towards Ego as landmark. Moving-Ego cases such as We’re racing towards the end of the semester or Vacation is just ahead/around the corner, show Ego moving or potentially moving on a path relative to temporal landmarks.\(^8\)

We therefore make the categorical distinction proposed by Moore (1999), and later described by Núñez (1999), between Time-based metaphors and Ego-based metaphors (of which Moving-Time and Moving-Ego metaphors are sub-cases). Because the word based is not specific enough, we now prefer to use the terms Ego-
Reference Point (Ego-RP) and Time Reference Point (Time-RP), to clearly distinguish between the question of what is moving (Ego or Time) and what is the landmark relative to which motion is construed (Ego or Time). Front-back orientation can be established for either a moving or a static landmark.\textsuperscript{9}

Nuñez and Motz (in preparation) have recently gathered experimental evidence from priming which supports the psychological reality of the Ego-RP vs Time-RP distinction. After priming with an image of a sequence of cubes moving across a screen horizontally (in either direction), subjects responded to the question: Last Wednesday’s meeting had been moved forward two days. On what day did the meeting take place? They gave a strong predominance of Monday responses, choosing the interpretation of forwards as meaning “to an earlier time.” If these English-speaking subjects had been construing spatial relations relative to Ego, they would presumably construe all of last week as behind them, not in front of them: and forward relative to Ego’s orientational frame would have meant “to a later time, closer to Now.” The clear choice of Monday rather than Friday, after priming with motion scenes with no reference to Ego’s location, strongly supports the conclusion that there is no Ego reference point involved in the construal of such metaphoric phrases as move a meeting forwards: event times are rather construed as “moving” with respect to a temporal path or landscape.

\textsuperscript{8} Note that ahead requires a construal of at least potential motion along a path; you cannot say that the computer terminal is ahead of you on your desk.

\textsuperscript{9} Note that although Ego is ambiguous between the physical spatial experiencer and the subjective temporal experiencer, Time of course is clearly a target-domain term. Our terminology can therefore be taken as consistent in referring to the metaphors by the structure of the target temporal domain.
Let us now analyze in detail the mappings involved in these various conceptual metaphors.

### 1.2.1 Time-RP metaphor

In this conceptual metaphor Time is conceptualized in terms of objects (arranged in a sequence) and motion in space. Unlike the Ego-RP metaphors, the Time-RP metaphors don’t require a canonical observer in the source domain of space. The sequence may move horizontally as a whole, and in the direction of one of its extremes. The following is the mapping:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Domain</th>
<th>Target Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>On-dimensional Space</strong></td>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects</td>
<td>Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequence of objects</td>
<td>Chronological order of times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal movement of the entire sequence in one direction</td>
<td>Passing of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things oriented with their fronts in their direction of motion</td>
<td>Times oriented with their fronts in their direction of motion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An object $A$ located in front/behind an object $B$ → A time $A$ occurs earlier/later than time $B$

It is worth noting that in the source domain, “front” is already a metaphorical front recruited from another conceptual mapping, which allows us to ascribe a precise orientation to objects relative to their prototypical direction of motion (as in the front of a car). When objects don’t have inherent orientation relative to motion, such as a cube, we metaphorically ascribe to them orientation based on actual motion. For example, we can immediately and unerringly refer to the “front” side of a cube sliding along a flat surface (Fillmore XXXX). This metaphorical orientation in the source domain of objects forming a moving one-dimensional array is preserved in the target domain of Time.

The entailments of this conceptual metaphor are the following:

a) If time $B$ follows time $A$ (in the sequence), then time $B$ occurs later than time $A$ (i.e., it is in the future relative to time $A$). In other words, earlier times are in front of later times.

b) The mapping preserves transitive relations over relative positions in the sequence (source domain) such that they are available in the target domain. For instance, if object $C$ follows an object $B$ in the sequence, and object $B$ follows an object $A$, then object $C$ follows object $A$. Via the mapping, objects $A$, $B$, and $C$ are specific times, entailing that time $C$ follows (is in the future relative to) time $A$. 

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c) Since the sequence of objects is one-dimensional (linear), time is one-dimensional.

The Time-RP metaphor accounts for both the linguistic form and the semantic entailments of expression like:

Christmas follows Thanksgiving; Greenwich Mean Time is lagging behind the scientific standard time; Boston time is three hours ahead of San Francisco time.

Finally, we should note that English Time-RP metaphors are predominantly moving-time, or at any rate they evoke a source domain involving potential motion along a path. Note the preference for ahead of and behind in the examples given above; they cannot be replaced by in back of and in front of. This appears to be because ahead of and behind refer to spatial relationships between entities in motion (or ranged on a path), while in front of and in back of refer to static situations.

1.2.2 Ego-RP metaphor

As we saw above, the Ego-RP metaphor corresponds to the first metaphor of time discussed in the literature (as Time Passing is Motion in Lakoff, 1993). It has a somewhat more complex structure than the Time-RP metaphor we saw in the preceding subsection. Here times are conceptualized as objects located on a one-dimensional space (e.g., path) relative to a canonical observer (Ego). Under this mapping, time passing is conceived as the relative motion between the observer and
the times. The Ego-RP mapping has two variants defined by the nature of the moving agent. These two variants share the same inferential structure when no motion is concerned but differ with respect to the identity of the moving and static agents (Moving-Time and Moving-Ego). For the sake of clarity we first describe the shared (static) inferential structure present in both variants, and then we analyze the dynamic variants.

Ego-RP mapping (basic static structure)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Domain</th>
<th>Target Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal One-dimensional Space</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects</td>
<td>→ Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of objects along a horizontal one-dimensional path</td>
<td>→ Chronological order of times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects in front of the observer</td>
<td>→ Future times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cf. Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999, chap. 10) discussion of “orientation” in time metaphors.*
Objects behind the observer → Past times

Object co-located with the observer → Present time

The entailments of this shared static portion of the Ego-RP metaphor are the following:

a) Transitive properties applying to relative positions between the observer and the objects in the source domain are preserved in the target domain of time. For example, if, relative to the front of the observer, an object A is further away than an object B, and object B is further away than an object C, then object C is closer than object A. Via the mapping, this implies that time C is in a nearer future than time A.

b) The same relationships hold for objects behind the observer (in the past).

The inferential structure of this basic static portion of the Ego-RP metaphor accounts for a number of linguistics expressions:

The summer is still far away; The end of the world is near; The week ahead of us looks promising; Election day is here; I am looking ahead to Christmas.
Ego-RP mapping (additional dynamic structure)

When relative motion is added to the basic structure of the Ego-RP mapping, new inferential properties emerge. An important dimension of this extension is that motion is relative, that is, the mapping requires that there is a moving agent moving relative to a static passive entity: In the source domain either the observer moves relative to the objects located along the one-dimensional path, or the objects move relative to a static observer. The two variants of the dynamic version of the Ego-RP mapping are the following:

**Moving-Object variant of Ego-RP metaphor (Time Passing is Motion of an Object):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Domain</th>
<th>Target Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal One-dimensional Space</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic objects</td>
<td>Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects moving horizontally with respect to a static observer (with their fronts in direction of motion)</td>
<td>The passing of time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This variant has some important entailments, in addition to those outlined above for the general Ego-RP mappings:

a) The object passing the observer is, via the mapping, the present time.

b) Since there is only one observer, there is only one Present.

c) Since the objects all move in the same direction, time change is unidirectional.

d) Time has a perceived velocity relative to the observer.

e) Distant moving objects (from the observer) will arrive later at the observer’s location. Via the mapping this entails that a temporal experiencer will experience later times which are farther in the future.

f) Since the moving sequence of objects is one-dimensional, the static observer only experiences each object along the sequence once. Via the mapping this entails the temporal experiencer will only experience a given time only once.

The following are some linguistic expressions with their semantic entailments modeled by this variant of the Ego-RP mapping:

The new year is coming upon us; Time is flying by; The time has long since gone when …; The end of the world is approaching; The time to make a decision has come.
Moving-Ego variant of the Ego-RP metaphor (Time Passing is Motion Over a Landscape):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Domain</th>
<th>Target Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal One-dimensional Space</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Fixed objects with respect to which the observer moves → Times
- Frontal motion of the observer relative to objects → The passing of time
- The distance moved by the observer → The amount of time passed

Some important entailments in addition to those of the general Ego-RP metaphor:

a) Time has an extension, and can be measured.

b) An extended time, like a spatial area, may be conceived as a bounded region.

c) A moving observer will arrive later at a destination which is farther forwards along her path. Via the mapping, this entails that times which are farther in the future will be experienced later by the temporal observer.

d) Since the space is one-dimensional (one-way passage along a linear path), the moving observer only experiences each location along the path once. Via the
mapping this entails that the temporal experiencer will only experience a given time only once.

This form of the mapping accounts for another set of linguistics expressions:

She passed the time happily; We are approaching the end of the summer. He left his difficult childhood behind. We are racing through the semester. We are coming to the end of the month; How long is she staying?

As we can see, the two forms of Ego-RP mappings have quite different inferential structures, and as Lakoff (1993) has pointed out, they are sometimes inconsistent with each other. The same lexical items used in both variants have inconsistent readings. For example, the word approaching in The end of the world is approaching (Moving-time variant), and in We are approaching the end of the summer (Moving-Ego variant) take different arguments. Both refer metaphorically to temporal relations, but the former takes a moving time as a first argument and the latter takes a moving observer as a first argument. The same is valid for come in the time has come and in We are coming to the end of the year. Despite these differences, however, there is a crucial entailment shared by both variants:
• If time A approaches the observer (Moving-time variant) or if the observer approaches time A (Moving-Ego variant), it is true, in both cases, that the metaphorical distance between the observer and time A

1) gets shorter as the action “approaching” takes place, and

2) will be shorter after the action “approaching” is over.

Núñez (1999) has argued that given this “general truth,” it would be very tempting to say that both variants can be reduced to a unique abstract mapping characterizing this fundamental entailment. Such a mapping, however, would allow also cases in which both entities, the observer and the objects, move simultaneously, as in “We and Christmas are approaching each other” for which entailments (1) and (2) would also be true. Since such cases haven’t been empirically observed in natural language, they must be explicitly excluded from the characterization of the Ego-RP mapping. This is done by precisely characterizing in the source domains of both variants the impossibility of simultaneous motion of observer and objects. From a cognitive perspective it would be a mistake to consider the two variants of the Ego-RP metaphor as “equivalent cases” only because the outcome once the action is performed (i.e., approaching) is equivalent. So the two variants must be considered as cognitively different. 11

11 Cf. Langacker’s discussion of the cognitive differences between compositionally distinct linguistic expressions; although grandmother and parent’s mother may identify the same referents, it does not follow that they do so via identical cognitive processes.
A plausible explanation for why such simultaneous Ego-and-Time motion metaphors are not found is the importance of Landmark-Trajector or Figure-Ground structure in the construal of spatial scenes. If Ego and Time were both construed as figures in motion, against what ground would the motion be cognitively construed?  

Now that we have explicitly characterized the various mappings and their entailments we can further develop our analysis. We can see clearly why Christmas is coming and bygone days are linguistic instantiations of the metaphorical Moving-Time mapping variant of the Ego-RP metaphor (Times are objects in unidirectional, linear motion with respect to Ego). The physical location of the viewer or deictic center (HERE) is mapped onto the temporal NOW (Christmas will soon be here); and a time’s transition from futurity to past is mapped onto its passing the viewer. The order of events or times corresponds to the order of the moving objects in the “queue” along the path (e.g., Christmas follows Thanksgiving) where earlier times are in front of later times, and later times are behind earlier times. In the contrasting Moving-Ego variant of the Ego-RP metaphor, Self is a moving person, and Time is a linear, unidirectional array along which Ego moves. In this mapping, we find that necessarily FUTURE IS IN FRONT OF EGO and PAST IS BEHIND EGO.

Future events can coherently be understood as “in front” of Ego whether Ego is moving or standing still, so long as Ego is construed as “facing” towards the Future. As Moore (1999) has pointed out, the basic distinction between Ego-RP and Time-RP

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12 Cf. Talmy XXXX, Langacker XXX for treatments of figure-ground and landmark-trajector expressions in
spatializations of time, can be clearly made whether or not change or motion is part of the construal. In saying that Christmas follows Thanksgiving, we are talking about the relationship of two times in terms of a spatial relationship between a landmark and a trajectory object – both moving objects. Ego is not referenced. And although the preferred tense of the statement may change, the verb follow will still be appropriate in describing the relationship 2004 follows 2003, whether the two years in question are past or future relative to Ego and Now. In an Ego-RP construal, the relation between an event or a time and the experiencer’s Now is highlighted: Summer vacation is still ahead of me and Summer vacation is coming both specifically reference the futurity of the vacation with respect to Now, although only one describes Time as “moving.”

It has been pointed out that spatial metaphors for time have a strong experiential basis in everyday human experience of motion along a path, and of moving entities passing us on a path (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Emanatian XXXX, Sweetser XXXX, Núñez 1999, Moore 1999, Lakoff and Núñez 2000). For example, if we walk forwards along a path from point A to point N, we experience a correlation between locations along the path and times. The moment when I reach point N is in the future relative to the point when the action of moving started to take place (i.e., point A). The two correlated domains are both linearly structured and preserve a close isomorphism: just as I cannot get from point A to point E without going to the intervening points B, C, and
D along the way, so I cannot get from 4:00 PM to 4:05 PM without living through the intervening times.

This correlation is obviously only partial in our experience: in space, I can step sideways off a path, or turn backwards and head the opposite way, while time remains inherently unidirectional and unidimensional. But there is nonetheless a salient correlation between known past times and known (seen, experienced) locations, and between unknown future times and unknown (still unseen and unexperienced) locations on a partially traversed path. Further, although paths are inherently accessible for traversal in either direction, human bodily interaction with paths is inherently asymmetric at any given time. Due to species-specific biology and morphology, forwards rather than backwards (or sideways) motion is effortless, accurate, and generally natural for humans. So human motion experience does in some important respects inherently parallel the intrinsic asymmetry of temporal experience.

Because of their fundamental nature, one would expect these correlations between time and self-motion to be experienced by all humans – and most likely by some other animals, at least by primates. Similarly, we all experience objects in motion relative to ourselves. Construals of time as relative motion (whether Time or Ego is moving) thus seem likely candidates for Primary Metaphors (Grady 1997XX, C. Johnson 1997XX), based on the kind of pervasive and salient experiential correlation of two domains which constitutes a Primary Scene.
And indeed, these mappings seem pervasively salient in the world’s languages, being both the primary sources for lexical expressions of temporal reference and the primary sources of tense markers (where the etymologies of these are known) (REFS Heine XXXX, Bybee XXXX). As one might expect, Ego-RP models are the ones involved in deictic temporal reference with respect to Now, and thus in tense systems; deictic motion verbs such as COME and GO are frequently recruited as tense markers, as in the English gonna future (Fleischman 1982a,b; Emanatian XXXX; Bybee XXXX, Bybee and Pagliuca XXXX). And Time-RP models are involved in expression of temporal relations between reference events, without relation to Now: for example, English before and after, which etymologically meant “in front of” and “behind” (and once partook of the same Time-RP metaphor as Christmas follows Thanksgiving) refer to the relation between two times, independent of those times’ relation to Now.

1.3. Evaluating crosscultural variation in mapping patterns.

Now that we have laid out the parameters involved in the mapping of time onto space, it is time to directly address the earlier claims in the literature that in certain languages, “the future is in back.” Cultural analysts have long been interested in cultural differences; they have not been slow to notice languages where words meaning FRONT and BACK, or IN FRONT OF and BEHIND, appear to be used in temporal senses opposite to those expressed by European words with the same spatial meanings. Moore (1999) concludes that in the cases accessible in the literature, analysts
have been misled by rather sketchy statements of the English mappings, and are not in fact comparing the right data. In most cases, the confusion is between Ego-RP and Time-RP metaphors.

We concur with Moore’s assessment that none of the examples in the literature are plausible cases of Ego-RP temporal metaphors wherein FUTURE IS IN BACK OF EGO. Thornton (1982, 70ff.) compares Maori uses of FRONT words to mean “earlier” with parallel Classical Greek uses; she appears to be confusing Ego-RP and Time-RP metaphors, giving no evidence that the long-past Maori events are seen as “in front of” Ego rather than “in front of” later events. Dunkel (1983) debunks some of the Greek parallels invoked by Thornton, arguing that there is no evidence that Classical Greek has a metaphor PAST IS IN FRONT OF EGO – though indeed it does productively construe earlier (and perhaps past!) events as in front of later ones. Klein (1987), claiming to provide evidence of a cyclic time model in Toba, wherein the experiencer faces the past and “future precedes past,” actually provides no concrete evidence for a future-before-past construal. In the process, she gives some quite suggestive evidence for models such as FUTURE EVENTS ARE OBJECTS APPROACHING THE EXPERIENCER – very similar to English Christmas is coming. Dahl (1995) argues that for Malagasy, Ego faces the past and time is cyclic. However, Dahl’s data most clearly show a Moving Time metaphor, with Time-RP uses of IN FRONT OF to mean “earlier than” – no uncommon pattern in Indo-European languages either. The added cyclic structure suggested by Klein and Dahl is another structure which can be superimposed
on linear temporal structure; temporal linearity coexists with and is mapped onto cyclic structure such as the repeating structure of the solar year. In English, as well as in Malagasy, Christmas 2003 precedes Thanksgiving 2004. A circular path preserves linear topology, in the sense that at any given point on the path, the traveler is experiencing a local linear environment and forwards orientation with respect to it.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of such reports is that some anthropologists, as well as those cited above) have described speakers’ claims that the future is “behind” Ego in the metaphoric sense of being unknown (cf. Miracle & Yapita 1981; Hardman 1988, 1998; Hardman, Vásquez and Yapita, 1988, as well as those cited above). One of the top candidates for a universal metaphor is KNOWLEDGE IS VISION (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Sweetser 1990; Lakoff 1993; C. Johnson 1997).13 Things behind Ego are visually inaccessible, hence unknown. In temporal experience, it is equally true that Realis (including Past) is known, while Future is unknown. We shall return to this part of the mappings in our discussion of Aymara; here, let us note that the anthropologists’ evidence is scanty and ambiguous. Klein, for example, says that Toba speakers are “looking back over their shoulder at the future” – a description which is, to say the least, susceptible to multiple interpretations. Someone looking back over her shoulder is in one sense “facing” the direction of gaze; and in another sense they could be seen as “facing” in the direction of overall bodily orientation. On top of this, it is unclear in Klein, Øyvind, and Thornton (since they do not give full linguistic analyses
of examples, carefully distinguishing Ego-RP reference from Time-RP reference)
exactly how the speakers described the spatial relation of time to Ego, and how much of the construal is the analyst’s.

Another factor which may have added to the confusion is that as discussed in section 1.2, individual spatial forms are sometimes available for usage with reference to either Ego-RP or Time-RP metaphoric mappings, and are thus ambiguous in referring to time. If Ego is the reference point from which we are calculating forwards, then moving the meeting forwards is evidently moving it relatively farther into Ego’s future (this has been referred to as Moving Ego, although the crucial thing for the mapping here seems to be Ego’s orientation towards the future, rather than motion). If, on the other hand, the forward direction is calculated relative to Time, then we have a dynamic Time-RP mapping, and we can assume that “forwards” is in the direction of the times’ motion, which is from future towards past. Moving the meeting forwards is thus moving it up in the queue of times on the path, hence to an earlier rather than a later time. Figure 2 lays out these two interpretations.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

This brings us to a final problem with the claims about temporal metaphor in the literature. Nearly all analysts seem eager to present a given culture as having a single

\[13\] Though cf. Wilkins XXXX on metaphors of knowledge as hearing in XXX; further discussion in section
unified model of time. In order to do this, they often seem to connect quite scattered
data-points to form a broader picture. For languages where analysts have examined a
fuller range of data, it seems clear that there is not a single entirely coherent metaphorical
model of time. English not only varies between the Time-RP and Ego-RP construals,
but between static and moving construals of time as well. So an added concern, in
analyzing the Aymara data, is to avoid mentally creating a single synthesis of “the
Aymara model of time” without sufficiently rich justification.

As mentioned above, added patterns are superimposed on these in many
languages. In Chinese (REFS XXXX), earlier times are also seen as being above later
times, and particular set phrases in Chinese vary between this vertical metaphor and
the front-back models. Some European languages also have up-down metaphors
which relate to temporal structure. Consider the French historical term basse antiquité
(Late Antiquity, lit. “low antiquity”), or the two contrasting usages High Middle Ages
(in English) and bas moyen age (lit. “low middle ages”) in French, technical phrases used
by historians to refer to the same period, the later medieval period. The French usages
seem related to a metaphor such as EARLIER IS HIGHER, LATER IS LOWER; while the
English usage seems related to the construal of the later medieval period as culturally
and intellectually closer to the following Renaissance, a period of “high” culture
(GREATER CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENT IS GREATER HEIGHT). And Aymara also
has some more minor vertical temporal metaphors: alay lunisa (“high Monday”) means
“next Monday.” In none of these cases are front-back temporal metaphors missing from the relevant languages’ linguistic systems – but other metaphors are present as well. Similarly, Emanatian (XXXX) has shown that in deixis, as in spatial deixis, it is possible to displace the deictic center; the result is added complexity in spatial metaphors for temporal structure. Once again, this system is not a replacement for, but an elaboration of, the “standard” options for mapping space onto time.

So we have quite broad evidence (though surely not full evidence for a “universal”) supporting the position that certain patterns of spatiotemporal metaphor recur crosslinguistically precisely because certain patterns of universal human experience motivate these metaphoric structures.

In the next section we will present the Aymara linguistic evidence of spatiotemporal metaphoric mappings; in the following section we will set them in their gestural context.

2. What can the Aymara linguistic data tell us about Aymara construals of time?

The following are common linguistic expressions in Aymara. In these examples, we can see the use of nayra (“eye, sight, front”) and q’ipa (“back”) with temporal meanings. Such uses are common in everyday Aymara usage.

Temporal uses of nayra:

(1) nayra mara (“last year”)
Before addressing the difference between spatial and temporal senses of nayra, it is important to note that it is not unusual for one word to have the meanings of both “eye” and “face” (cf. Classical Greek ops), or “face” and “front” (cf. English face, or front, which etymologically derives from a Latin word for “forehead”). These appear to be normal polysemy patterns. The eye is part (and a salient and important part) of the face, so there is a strong metonymic link between these senses. And the face is perhaps the single strongest defining factor in identifying the front of a human being; another crucial frame-metonymic link. We shall here assume that it is normal for the same word to mean “eye” and “front” – our interest is in the link between the senses of “front” and “past.”
An interpretation offered by previous analysts (Miracle & Yapita 1981) is that PAST IS IN FRONT in Aymara because the past is known, and the area in front of the speaker is seen. This invokes the KNOWLEDGE IS VISION metaphor discussed above, mapping a known period of time or sequence of events onto a visually accessible physical area. In somewhat mixed-domain language, Miracle and Yapita cite a contrast between the “unseen future and the visible present-past”; so more precisely, we should say that in Aymara REALIS IS IN FRONT and IRREALIS IS IN BACK. As we shall later see from gestural data, the present is metaphorically located immediately at the front of the speaker’s body, while the past is the space farther in front of the speaker.

Nayra is also regularly used in Aymara to mean “first” in a narrative sequence—another case of a use that means “earlier than (some other relevant times or events).” A story-teller might start out by saying nayra (lit., “front”, here “first/earliest”), and label subsequent episodes with ukat (“from that”). In enumerating entities in an ordinal list, speakers also label the first entity as nayra(xa) and subsequent entities as ukat q’iparu (lit., towards-back from-that”, “backwards from that”), where an English speaker might say “first”, “next,” “next”… These uses of nayra do not specifically mean “earlier than Now;” they appear to refer to the sequential relations between events, without reference to their relation to the Present.

However, (1) cannot mean “the year before”; it means specifically “last year”, i.e., “the year before Now.” Similarly, (2) means “a long time ago (before Now),” not
simply “at a much earlier time.” And (3) refers to the Past, not simply to a time earlier than some other time. These uses of nayra are deictically framed uses, expressing the relation to the speaker’s present. This relation is implicit – there is no overt reference to “I” or “Now” – but that is equally true of examples such as the weeks ahead (meaning future weeks) in English, which carries much the same meaning as the weeks ahead of us, despite the lack of an overt noun phrase expressing the landmark of the “ahead” relation.

So we have evidence for at least two distinct uses of the Aymara word for “in front of”, one meaning “past” (Ego-RP) and one meaning “earlier than” (Time-RP). Given the fact that there is no overt linguistic expression of the landmarks (like us, in the English ahead of us), in the deictically interpreted nayra examples, we may look for added sources of evidence to support our claim that the “past” senses of nayra are metaphorical interpretations of deictic spatial senses. Gesture is one such source of evidence.

Temporal uses of q’ipa:
Aymara q’ipa, “back” is used in a parallel fashion, to refer to the future or to relatively later times. Examples (4)-(7) are examples of deictically centered uses, which refer to times in the future relative to Now, as being “behind (Ego).” Again, there is no overt expression of the Ego-RP nature of these expressions – no “behind us” – so gesture may help to solidify our evidence for the deictic semantics of these expressions.
(4) q“ipüru ("a future day")
   literal gloss:
   q”ipa  uru
   back/ behind  day

(5) akata q”iparu ("from now on")
   literal gloss:
   aka -ta q”ipa  uru
   this from back/ behind day

(6) q”ipa marana ("in the next [immediately future] year")
   literal gloss:
   q”ipa  mara  -na
   back/ behind  year  in/ on/ at

(7) q”ipa pacha/timpu ("future time")
   literal gloss:
   q”ipa  pacha/timpu*
   back/ behind  time
   *(timpu is borrowed from the Spanish word for time, tiempo)

Example (8), on the other hand, seems ambiguous between a sense of a day which follows some other day, and a future day relative to Now. Example (9) refers to a period following some reference year ("that year") rather than to a period later than Now. These seem to be instances of non-deictic, Time-RP spatial construals of time.

(8) q”ipa uruna ("on the next day / on a future day")
literal gloss:
q“ipa  uru  -na
back/ behind  day  in/ on/ at

(9) uka marata q“iparu (“from that year on”)
literal gloss:
uka  mara  -ta  q“ipa  uru
this  year  from  back/ behind  day

(10) is a conventional phrase of farewell, and appears therefore to mean “until a later day (than today)” – another deictic use.

(10) q“ipurkama (“until another day; so long”) (Briggs 1993, p.412)
literal gloss:
q“ipa  uru  kama
back  day  until

Other expressions:
As mentioned above, the morphemes nayra and q“ipa are also used to refer to positions in a sequence. Here we find this mapping in the terms for various harvesting periods in an agricultural cycle (11-13). Notice that the structure here is richer than that of the narrative and enumerative sequential uses: the harvest cycle has a “front” (the start) and a “back” (the end), and even a “middle.” There is no deictic structure here, but purely sequential relations unconnected with a specific Now: the “front harvest” is simply before other harvests in the same cycle.
(11) nayra sata ("first harvest")
   literal gloss:
   nayra  sata
   eye/ front/ sight  harvest

(12) taypi sata ("middle harvest")
   literal gloss:
   taypi  sata
   middle/ center  harvest

(13) q"ipa sata ("last harvest")
   literal gloss:
   q"ipa  sata
   back/ behind  harvest

Overall, we have seen that Aymara linguistic forms give evidence for both sequential temporal interpretations of nayra and q"ipa (as “earlier” and “later” respectively) and deictic tense-marking interpretations (as “past” and “future”). Ego and Now remain implicit, rather than overtly marked, in Aymara deictic linguistic expressions for “next year” or “last year” – we are never overtly told that it is the year “in front of me” or “in back of us.”

Aymara Ego-RP time metaphors appear to be largely static; there are a few uses such as jutir pacha “coming time”, attested in Inland Iquique and in some Bolivian dialects (see also Bertonio [1612/ 1984]). But far more dominant are static locational forms such as “back time” for future. Bilingual speakers are of course familiar with
some of the common Spanish motion metaphors for time, as well. Nuñez, Neumann and Mamani (1997) noted a potential correlation between temporal uses of Aymara motion verbs and the presence of Spanish loan words; this is worth investigating, since it may show that these Aymara uses have been reinforced by Spanish bilingualism.

As we shall see, gestural evidence gives strong additional support to our interpretations of the conceptual mappings involved in these predominant static spatiotemporal metaphors in Aymara.

3. How can Aymara speakers’ gestures help us where linguistic data does not?

3.1. Gesture as a mirror of cognition, including culture-specific cognitive patterns.

We have seen that Aymara linguistic forms do constrain our hypotheses about Aymara time metaphors, but not sufficiently for us to answer some important questions. A neglected but powerful source of data is the gestural track which is universally co-produced with spoken languages. As McNeill (1992, 2000) and others have argued, it offers unique access to some of the less conscious aspects of the cognitive processes underlying language: while language is at least partially consciously monitored, most people are unaware of gesturing at all. And gesture does, like language, represent metaphoric mappings between domains.

In the last twenty years, gesture studies has moved forward dramatically, thanks to the work of pioneers such as Kendon (1980), McNeill (1992), Goldin-Meadow & C. Mylander (1984), and many others. Research in a large variety of areas, from child development, to neuropsychology, to linguistics, and to anthropology, has shown the
intimate link between oral and gestural production. Finding after finding has shown
that gestures are produced in astonishing synchronicity with speech, that they develop
in close relation with speech, and that brain injuries affecting speech production also
affect gesture production. The following is an abbreviated list of sources of evidence
supporting (1) the view that speech and gesture are in reality to facets of the same
cognitive linguistic reality, and (2) and embodied approach for understanding
language, conceptual systems, and high-level cognition:

1) Speech-accompanying gesture is a crosscultural universal. (McNeill, 1992; Núñez &
   Sweetser, 2001; Iverson & Thelen 1999).

2) Gestures are less monitored than speech, and they are to a great extent unconscious.
   Speakers are often unaware that they are gesturing at all (McNeill, 1992)

3) Gesture show an astonishing synchronicity with speech. They are manifested in a
   millisecond-precise synchronicity, in patterns which are specific to a given language

4) Gestures are produced without the presence of interlocutors, e.g., people gesture
   while talking on the telephone, and in monologues; and congenitally blind subjects

5) Gestures are co-processed with speech. Stutterers stutter in gesture too, and
   impeding hand gestures interrupts speech production (Mayberry and Jaques 2000).
6) Hand signs are affected by the same neurological damage as speech. Left hemisphere damaged signers manifest similar phonological and morphological errors as those observed in speech aphasia (Hickok, Bellugi, and Klima, 1998).

7) Gesture and speech develop closely linked (Iverson & Thelen 1999; Bates et al, 2001).

8) Gesture provide complementary content to speech content. Speakers synthesize and subsequently cannot distinguish information taken from the two channels (Kendon, 2000).

9) Gestures are co-produced with abstract metaphorical thinking. Linguistic metaphorical mappings are paralleled systematically in gesture (McNeill, 1992; Cienki, 1998; Sweetser, 1998; Núñez & Sweetser, 2001).

We will show that Aymara speakers’ gestures provide further evidence that their construal of time involves a FUTURE IS IN BACK OF EGO (and PAST IS IN FRONT OF EGO) mapping. But gestural evidence also shows us aspects of this model which are not directly expressed in speech.

The general results of gesture research pose problems for any approach which assumes that culture and cognitive structure are only to be found in the conscious mind. Although instantiated in the body, and making use of shared, mutually observable space, gestures are culture-specific, as is language. The first notable example of such culture-specificity lies in what Kendon (XXXX) has labeled quotable gestures (also called emblems), conventional gesture complexes which are meaningful
even without accompanying language, and which often have meanings which are of the same order as those of short colloquial linguistic expressions. Manual “quotables” include more content-oriented usages such as the thumb-and-index circle ("o" hand) used by English speakers to mean "nothing" or "there's none." Note that unlike less conventional hand-gestures, this can be correctly or incorrectly produced. It is not acceptable to make a thumb+little-finger circle instead of a thumb+index circle, in gesturing “none.” Some emblematic gestures seem so tightly tied to speech that they are regularly retained when interlocutors cannot observe them; English speakers nod, and Japanese speakers bow, during telephone conversations.

But McNeill has shown (1992) that even less conventionalized gesture - so-called "free" gesture accompanying speech - follows tight language-specific patterns in its co-timing with speech, as well as in which aspects of the described situation are depicted in gesture.

Spatial structure is in one sense "directly" represented in gesture - that is, it is represented in the same medium, space. In another sense, however, the speaker's construal is paramount in this as in other aspects of linguistic and gestural representation. Haviland (1993), for example, describes a speaker of Nguugu Yimidhirr, who in retelling a story of a boat capsizing, automatically adjusted his gestural patterns so as to match the actual "absolute" compass orientation of the boat's motion in the actual event. Most English speakers would not do this, which may be connected with the fact that English does not normally use absolute spatial coordinates.
for everyday location of small objects in the immediate environment. In Guugu
Ymithirr, unlike English, one would not be able to say that the mug is next to, or in
front of, the speaker - one would have to say that it is east, or north, of her, or whatever
the appropriate direction might be (cf. Levinson 2003; Majid et al. 2003).

In short, whenever the speaker is referring to anything besides the actual present
physical space, gesture (and sign language too) necessarily involve some mapping
between the real space and represented spatial (or other) structure. The nature of these
mappings is culture-specific, and therefore shows more extensive variation
crossculturally than do gestures referring to the actual surrounding space. Our
understanding of this is that gestures enact blends (in the sense of Fauconnier and
mental space blending principles apply similarly in all cases, but the precise mappings
vary.

A crucial contrast we need to draw in gesture as well as in speech is between
deictically centered and non-deictically-centered gestural structures. Paul Dudis
(XXXX) has pointed out that in ASL spatial arrays, it is possible for the speaker to be
located in the array or not. For example, a signer who is asked which student (out of a
class not currently in session) is the one being talked about might point to a particular
locus to her left; this might mean, in context, that the student sits in a location in that
orientation from the speaker’s usual location in the classroom. You would have to
know the speaker’s usual classroom location, as well as orientation, to know the
relevant student's location. On the other hand, in setting out a map of Berkeley for an interlocutor, there would be no place on that map where the speaker was located. Although there would inevitably be a perspectival choice of mapping onto the Real Space (possibly north = away from speaker, south = towards speaker, east and west = towards the speaker's right and left respectively), the speaker's own body and bodily location would not be part of that mapping.

It is well known that gesture can be used metaphorically. Both in gesture and in signed languages, a gestural form which is iconic for a source-domain concept can be used to express its counterpart in the target domain of some metaphor. For example, an English speaker may move a hand forwards to indicate literal forwards motion or location; or a very similar gesture may refer to future time. Taub (XXXX) presents an extended analysis of the relationship between metaphor and iconicity in ASL forms, an analysis which has inspired much of the subsequent work on parallel phenomena in gesture. Cienki (1998, XXXX) gives detailed examples of hands moving up and down (on “virtual” vertical scales) to refer to good and bad grades, and to good and bad moral behavior. Further examination of metaphoric uses of gesture can be found in Müller (XXXX), Sweetser (1998), Parrill and Sweetser (2001), Nuñez (in press), and Smith (ms.)

Cienki XXXX and Sweetser XXXX have argued that such metaphoric uses of iconic gesture provide interesting evidence of the presence of the source-domain concepts in the mind of the speaker. When such gestures accompany metaphoric
language, the gesture offers converging evidence, along with the linguistic forms, of the
cognitive processing of two domains. For example, Sweetser XXXX documents a
speaker saying put you away meaning “put you in jail”, accompanied by a gesture of
moving an object (perhaps a box) from one place to another - literal “putting away.”
This is additional evidence in support of Gibbs’ arguments (based on other kinds of
data) that speakers may be doing metaphoric processing even of very conventional and
idiomatic metaphoric phrases. Cienki also gives examples of cases where speakers use
literal language about an abstract domain (good grade, bad grade) while gesturing
metaphorically about the same domain (e.g., up and down gestures for good grades
and bad grades respectively). In these cases, only the gestures let us know that the
speaker is construing the relevant domain metaphorically.

The distinction between deictically centered spaces and spaces without deictic
structure is of particular interest in examining metaphoric gestures representing time.
As we mentioned earlier, language involves both deictic construals of time (relative to
some experiencer’s Now) and non-deictic representations of temporal sequence. Tense
is inherently deictic, as are words like now, then, and ago: a message saying I will arrive
three days from now would be completely uninformative without knowing the time of
writing. Words like before and after, on the other hand, are not based on a deictic frame:
they are usable, as in examples cited above, even to describe generic repetitive
relationships such as Christmas comes after Thanksgiving. Gesture shows the same
dichotomy. Co-speech gesture and signed languages both manifest (1) spatialization of
time relative to Now, represented as spatial relationship to the speaker’s physical location (Here), and (2) representation of temporal sequence without reference to Now. An English speaker, for example, might gesture forwards for the future, and point at the ground in front of her feet while saying right now; these are part of a very general timeline, with future metaphorically located in front and past in back of speaker. However, she might also represent a sequence of days or years as a horizontal line from left to right across her gesture space, gesturing to points on that line to refer to particular times or events; in such a left-right timeline, there is no inherently built-in Now, since the speaker’s location is not part of the spatial structure that is mapped onto time.

3.2. Collection of the Aymara gestural data.

Speech and gestural data were collected through videotaped ethnographic interviews with Aymara speakers from the Andes’ highlands of Northern Chile (Núñez, Neumann, and Mamani, 1997). The interviews took place in the two most important Aymara speaking regions in Northern Chile, namely, inland Arica, and inland Iquique, near the border with Bolivia. From the former region the towns covered were Codpa, Livilcar, Pachama, Chapiquiña, Socoroma, Chucuyo, and Parinacota; from the latter, Cariquima, Villa Blanca, Chijo, Mauque, Ancuyo, Isluga, and Enquelga. A few interviews took place in the cities of Arica and Iquique themselves, where there are several communities of Aymara people who have immigrated to these ports. The series
of interviews were completed within 18 months. Approximately 20 hours of raw videotaped interviews were obtained, from which selected passages were taken, and later digitized and captured for audio/video analysis.

27 subjects participated in the study (all of them adults, 65% men, 35% women). Approximately 10% of them were monolinguals (Aymara), 40% had Spanish as a second language (showing significant, but no full mastery of Spanish), 40% were clear bilinguals, and 10% were Spanish monolinguals with very limited knowledge of Aymara. For the analysis of gestures the last category was ignored.

Interviews were informal, usually lasting between 20-50 minutes, and they were meant to be like an everyday conversation. The interview, which was designed to cover discussions involving reference to time, had two parts. In the first part, subjects were asked to talk about, make comments, compare, and explain a series of events that have happened or that were expected to happen in the context of their communities. In the second part subjects were asked to talk about traditional “sayings,” anecdotes, and expressions in Aymara involving time, and to give examples of them. In the case of bilingual interviews, subjects were asked to translate expressions from Spanish to Aymara and vice-versa and to explain them. These expressions were taken from everyday language and from classic texts on Aymara language (Bertonio, 1612/1984; Briggs, 1993; Grebe, 1986, 1990; Hardman, Vásquez, and Yapita, 1988; Miracle and Yapita, 1981; Tarifa, 1969). The course of the interviews was overall rather flexible and open-ended. Depending on the context and the language preference of the subjects,
interviews took place in Aymara (with the help of informants), in Spanish, and sometimes in both.

3.3. Results.

3.3.1. Ego-RP gestures

In our videotaped data, Aymara speakers gesture both in Ego-RP and in Time-RP patterns. Alongside the spatial language used to represent time as in front (nayra) and in back (q’ipa) of Ego, they gesturally represent time as deictically centered space: the speaker’s front surface is essentially Now, as in English speakers’ gestures. The space behind the speaker is the Future, while the space in front of the speaker is the Past. Locations in front and closer to the speaker are more recent past times, while locations in front and farther from the speaker are less recent times: speakers contrast “last year” with “this year” by pointing downwards first at a more distant point and then at a nearer one. The farther in the past the reference event is, the farther upwards is the angle of temporal “points” forwards; this seems to represent added distance in space of the point’s goal, as the trajectory of a thrown object has to be higher to throw farther. When talking about wider ranges of time, rather than particular points in time, we have seen speakers sweeping the dominant hand forwards to the full extent of the arm as they talk about distant past generations and times, or pulling the hand back towards themselves as they talk about the relation of these past generations to the present.
These forwards and backwards gestures contrast with left-to-right gestures made accompanying linguistic forms such as uru sarjiwa, ukuru, ukuru (“day goes, and day and day”), “time goes on day by day.” The L-to-R gestures have no origo at Speaker’s body; and they accompany language which construes time as general motion (relative to an unmentioned landscape), rather than motion relative to Ego. We here set them aside, since we are specifically discussing front-back metaphoric construals of Time.

Example 1. (Clip SB.1. Speaker from Socoroma; bilingual interview)

In this video clip, an Aymara speaker gestures as he repeats and translates the phrase nayra mara, literally “front time”. His Spanish translations of nayra mara are tiempu antiguo “old times” and tiempo antes “time before”. He gestures with his hand forwards from his body as he makes this explanation. The first two forward strokes are left-handed (he is holding a zampoña, a musical instrument, in his right hand) and co-timed with the two words tiempo antiguo. The third forward stroke is right-handed (he has shifted the instrument to his left hand) and higher than the left-handed ones; it is co-timed with antes “before” in the phrase tiempo antes.

Example 2. (Clip 21. Speaker from Pachama; bilingual interview)

He is talking about his “ancestors” (achachilas) when the interviewer suggests that this might have been the time of the Incas (gentil timpu). The speaker, who is thinking of more immediate ancestors such as great-grandparents, responds (rather
Ese es todavía más allá antes, “That is even further away before,” meaning apparently that the Incas are way earlier than what he’s talking about.

He gestures with both hands, an alternating rotating gesture upwards and away from the body. At the peak of the right hand’s rotation (co-timed with más “more” in más allá antes) the right hand forms a point upwards and forwards.

Example 3. (Clip SB3b. Speaker from Socoroma; bilingual interview)

(a) Continuing to explain nayra mara, the speaker says it is what is antiguo (“old”).

As he says antiguo, he sweeps his left hand and arm forwards (loose five handshape), starting from a point at the chest, and finally extending the arm with palm up. (His head is down at the start, and gradually moves up and turns to face the interviewer as the hand gesture moves outwards.)

(b) Similarly, 20 seconds later, in explaining pre-Spanish times (gentil timpu) the same speaker says la otra generación (“the other generation”), meaning distant ancestral generations. Co-timed with this phrase, he extends his right arm in two pointing gestures (with index finger), co-timed with the two words otra and generación. These are directed higher than his earlier points on antiguo and tiempo antiguo – the first is at his eye level, the second is above his head, pointing outward and upward.
All of these clips show Aymara speakers gesturing forwards with reference to past time, whether sweeping forwards over temporal extent of past years or pointing forwards away from the present towards the past. In the next set of clips, we see specific past and present (realis) periods of time metaphorically represented and pointed to contrastively as different spatial points, points nearer to the body representing times closer to the present.

Example 4. (Clip SB3a. Socoroma, bilingual interview)

(a) Speaking in Aymara, the speaker says aka maran(a) (“this year”) and gestures with the zampoña he is holding in his right hand, rotating and raising his wrist so that the instrument’s body points downwards in front of him from his hand. He holds until the word marana is finished.

(b) The speaker continues in Spanish, contrasting this year with earlier times. He transfers the zampoña to his left hand, as he explains to a Spanish-speaking interviewer that the past times (antes) were not like these years now (como estos años de ahora). As he says antes (“before”), he points his right arm (with extended index finger) outwards, forwards at an upwards angle. As he says como estos años de ahora (“like these years now”) he points downwards four times, closer to his body, with his right hand.
(c) Seventeen seconds later, the speaker says antigamente (“long ago, in the past”). He has once again transferred the zampoña to his left hand so that his right hand is free to point forwards with the index finger, co-timed with the word antigamente.

Example 5. (Clip SB2. Same speaker as Example 1: bilingual interview)
Here the speaker is translating and explaining the Aymara phrase miymarat aka mararu, “from last year to this year.” As he gives his Spanish translation, he gestures, pointing downwards first at a point farther in front of him as he says del año pasado “from last year” (point co-timed with pasado) and then moving his hand towards him and pointing downwards again at a point closer to his body, as he says a este año, “to this year” (final point co-timed with año).

The Aymara gestural representation of the future is less elaborated than that of the past. There are obvious “phonetic” reasons why this should be so: humans cannot gesture as far behind their bodies as in front, cannot see the gesture space behind them, and cannot control their over-the-shoulder gestures as accurately as forwards gestures. In this respect, Aymara speakers are truly a mirror image of English speakers (or ASL signers), whose spatial-gestural representation of the past is less elaborated than that of the future for exactly the same reasons. We have fewer “future” gestures in the Aymara data, and they do not actually involve moving the hand to a point behind the speaker, but using it to point backwards towards the area behind the speaker.
Example 6. (Clip 25. Speaker from Arica; bilingual interview)

The speaker is discussing tiempo futuro (“future time”). Co-timed with the word futuro, he gestures with his right hand (B handshape) across his body and pointing backwards over his left shoulder.

Example 7. (Clip 26. Arica, bilingual interview)

The speaker is contrasting past and future. He points backwards over his left shoulder, twice, as he says futuro. He then performs three forwards gestural sweeps as he mentions tiempo antiguo and nayra timpu (“past time”), using similar gestures with the Aymara and Spanish words. Next he points downwards twice with his index in front of him as he says hicha (Aymara “now”), accompanying this with a head-nod downwards and forwards. Finally, he performs an ipsilateral thumb-point, pointing over his right shoulder with his right thumb, as he returns to mention of the future with the word futuro.

3.3.2. Time-RP gestures.

Like speakers of a wide range of other languages, Aymara speakers also gesture about temporal sequence in a non-deictic way, talking about one year following another (with no specified relation to the present) while gesturing along a left-to-right timeline laid out in front of the speaker, which does not incorporate a deictic center. Most of the
motion language observed with temporal reference falls into this non-deictic category, and is accompanied by non-deictic gestures.

Left-to-right gestures, rather than forwards or backwards ones, accompany linguistic forms such as uru sarjiwa, ukuru, ukuru (“day goes, and day and day”), “time goes on day by day.” The L-to-R gestures have no origo at Speaker’s body; and they accompany language which construes time as general motion (relative to an unmentioned landscape), rather than motion relative to Ego. We here set them aside, since we are specifically discussing front-back metaphoric construals of Time.

3.3.3. Analysis and discussion.

One way of looking at this result is to see Aymara speakers as using temporal metaphors based on slightly different aspects of our experiential correlations between space and time than the metaphors used by many or most other languages. It has been claimed that Aymara speakers understand the future as behind them because it is unknown. Let us now unpack the mappings inherent in that claim.

First of all, it is important to note that all humans have a basic and central correlation between vision and knowledge. For sighted people, visual input is overwhelmingly our primary means of monitoring our larger surrounding environment, and is also constantly basic (in coordination with motor interaction and other senses) in our interaction with our immediate surroundings. Visual intake is a constant source of new information. It is therefore no surprise that it forms the basis for
a KNOWLEDGE IS VISION metaphor which is common across the world’s languages (cf. C. Johnson XXXX). Sweetser (1990) documents the pervasiveness of this metaphor in the Indo-European language family. But it is the norm around the world as well. Aymara is one more example.\(^{14}\)

Now imagine a static viewer with a visual field. She can only see what is in the “front” half of the space she is in – the direction she is facing. One might be able to creep up on her from behind, unseen; but this would be impossible from the opposite direction. Under such circumstances, what is seen correlates with what is known – and with what is in front of the viewer. Note that we are essentially ignoring the more distant surroundings, beyond the visual horizon; these are invisible and unknown, whether they are in front of the viewer or behind her.

But alter the picture. Imagine a moving person, walking along a path. Of course, like the static viewer, she has a visual field and can only see in front of her. However, another crucial correlation in her experience is that she does not know what she will find around the next turn in the path. An important division of the world for her, besides “what I can see in front of me” and “what I can’t see behind me” is the division between “places I haven’t yet been to – and thus haven’t seen and don’t know about” as opposed to “places I’ve been to already – and have thus seen and gained

\(^{14}\) Wilkins XXXX documents the importance of hearing in the metaphoric treatment of knowledge in Australian native languages. This metaphor should reasonably occur; hearing is also an extremely important sense, although Indo-European sources show hearing to be more of a metaphor for social compliance rather than for knowledge acquisition (Sweetser 1990). But such metaphors do not alter the primacy of KNOWLEDGE IS VISION in the world’s languages at large; nor do they change the shared basis for that metaphor, one shared by all humans.
some knowledge about.” The correlation here is not KNOWN IS IN FRONT and UNKNOWN IS IN BACK, but rather KNOWN IS BEHIND and UNKNOWN IS AHEAD.

People all share the understanding that the past is known, the future unknown. But English speakers, and indeed most of the human world, base their temporal metaphors on the experiential correlations Known is Behind Ego (i.e., behind a moving Ego on a path), Unknown is in Front of Ego (i.e., in front of a moving Ego on a path) – Aymara speakers seem to make use of Known is in Front of Ego, Unknown is in Back of Ego.

We suggest that one reason for the prevalence of the path-based spatiotemporal metaphors over the static visual-field-based ones is precisely that the latter are static. Our experience of time is dynamic. And the path-based metaphors give us a great many inferences which would be hard to get from a static spatial model of time. For example, I cannot infer from the fact that an object happens to be in front of a static viewer that she will be co-located with the object in the future – nor can I infer that an object behind her was co-located with her in the past. But these are appropriate inferences: future times will become present, and past times once were present. A path-based metaphor yields such inferences readily: a traveler will be at a location ahead of her, and has been at locations behind her. Further, among locations ahead of her, she will be at closer locations sooner than at more distant ones; which maps very nicely onto the linear sequence of future events. And so on. The path-based metaphors, as well as being appropriately dynamic, bring along a FUTURE IS
Conclusion and discussion.

How are our cultural models of time constituted, and how are they related to our models of space? In most cases, recent linguistic evidence suggests strongly that models of time are based on certain aspects of our spatial models, and that those aspects of spatial understanding are at least universally accessible crossculturally. We argue here that gestural data provides a unique source of empirical support for many of these claims, although also offering challenges to some of them.

Analysts of language cannot help being caught up in the fascinating question of the relationship between language and culture, and the equally complex one of the relationship between language and cognition. Within the past century, some very strong claims have been made in many different directions. Many cultural anthropologists would follow Whorf and Sapir in claiming that culture-specific factors (including language) necessarily shape our cognition at the most basic level; some would tend to cast doubt on any claims that there is a universal human cognitive base, in any meaningful sense. Current critical theory approaches to culture emphasize the degree to which all of our understanding is constructed - and constantly constructed in interaction - including our understanding of apparently objective entities such as our
own bodies, which might be supposed to give us some common hold on a shared reality.

And yet, at least of equal interest are plausible proposals for crosscultural cognitive universals. Color terms, once the "parade example" of cultural variability (if blue and green aren't universals, what is?) have in the last thirty years come to be seen instead as providing strong evidence of the constraints posed by human perception and cognitive processing on linguistic and cultural categorization. This is scarcely surprising: we apparently share much of our color perception - including the perceptual basis for focal colors - with some other primates, as well as with fellow humans.

A further complication lies in the fact that the same people don't necessarily always access the same cognitive domains in the same way. Language often seems to offer some particular range of culturally dominant cognitive approaches to a domain; as we know, English does not have only one way of conceptualizing time. Further, an investigation which is more distant from linguistic usage may reveal the possibility of the same speakers' accessing a different set of categories from those imposed by their language (cf. Kay and Kempton XXXX). Returning to Whorf with the added sophistication of recent crosslinguistic work on language use and acquisition, Slobin (XXXX) has proposed that we recognize that there is a possible contrast between "thinking for speaking" and other thinking. When speaking English, an English speaker has no choice but to attend to the sex of participants who are referred to by
third-person singular pronouns; in some languages, this would be unnecessary, while in others there would be far more need to formally mark semantically-based gender.

We have good crosscultural evidence for a range of experientially based ways of Thinking for Speaking about time. Often a given language manifests more than one of these patterns. The distinction between Time-RP and Ego-RP structures is itself a potential cognitive universal, since both kinds of structures are documented in many languages. One extremely dominant and salient pattern is the Ego-RP TIME IS EGO’S MOTION ALONG A PATH metaphor; its experiential basis is clearly universal, and the metaphor itself is so nearly universal that we cannot deny its cognitive accessibility to all humans. Instead of TIME IS EGO’S MOTION ALONG A PATH, Aymara uses a static mapping of Past and Future onto the space in front of and behind Ego, respectively. This mapping, while its underlying correlations are potentially accessible to any human, has distinctly less elaborate inferential mappings between source and target domains; this may account for its rarity as a primary metaphor of time. But unusual though it may be, gestural as well as linguistic data strongly and systematically attest to its cognitive reality in Aymara speakers.

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Cognitive research on metaphoric concepts of time has focused on differences between moving Ego and moving time models, but even more basic is the | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate. To read the article of this research, you can request a copy directly from the authors. Request full-text. Download citation. The Aymara, for example, gesture for the past as in front and the future behind (Núñez & Sweetser, 2006; see also Sullivan & Bui, 2016, for a similar pattern among Vietnamese). 8. You will have perfected (perfect) your English by the time you come back from Australia. 9. The movie (start) by the time we get there. 10. __ you _(finish) it by the time I come back? Penggunaan adverb of time : by the time, by this time next week, by this time next year, by the end of this year, before, by tomorrow, by next month and etc. PATTERN. 1. Verbal sentence ( it contains the verb, such as eat, drink, see, swim and etc ). (+) S+will+have+verb 3 + Object/Complement. (-) S+will+not+have+verb 3 + Object/Complement. Does your language shape your concept of time? Does the language you speak determine whether or not time even exists for you? These claims, from weak to strong, got the nickname "Sapir-Whorf", which I often hear pronounced “SA-pir Whorf”. Hopi Time became its poster child. Years after Hopi Time, researchers claimed they'd found new evidence showing Whorf was right about time all along. Like this set of experiments playing on the difference between how English and Mandarin speakers use space to talk about time. “Earlier” is to your left and “later” to your right in English, but in Mandarin things get vertical: “earlier” is up and “later” down. In Aymara, your nayra, your “eye” is in front of you, and your qhipa, your “back” is behind you. That's normal, but this isn't. Aymara, where the future is behind you: Convergent evidence from language and gesture in the crosslinguistic comparison of spatial construals of time. Rafael E. Núñez Department of Cognitive Science University of California at San Diego, USA. Eve Sweetser Department of Linguistics University of California at Berkeley, USA. We examine both linguistic and gestural data from Aymara, and find strong confirmation of this unusual culture-specific cognitive pattern. Gestural data provides crucial information not available to purely linguistic analysis, suggesting that when investigating conceptual systems both forms of expression should be analyzed complementarily.